In Part II of this two-part paper, we analyze the marginal prices derived in Part I of this two-part paper within a robust optimization framework. The load and generation are priced at Locational Marginal Price (LMP) while the uncertainty and generation reserve are priced at Uncertainty Marginal Price (UMP). The Financial Transmission Right (FTR) underfunding is demonstrated when there is transmission reserve. A comparison between traditional reserve price and UMP is presented. We also discuss the incentives for market participants within the new market scheme. P min ,P max ,P 0 : min/max/initial generation level (MW); fuel cost ($): aP 2 + bP + c ; R u ,R d : ramping up/down rate (MW/h); Cu ,C d : startup/shutdown cost ($); T on ,T off ,T 0 : min on/min off/initial time (h)
I. INTRODUCTION
I N Part I of this two-part paper, the theory for market clearing is presented [1] . The case studies are reported in Part II of this two-part paper. Two systems are simulated in this paper. The first one is a 6-bus system, and the second one is the IEEE 118-bus system. For the 6-bus system, the basic ideas of UMP are presented within the robust optimization framework. We show how to use the UMPs in the new scheme to clear the market in Section II-A. A comparison between the UMP and traditional reserve price is made in Section II-B without transmission constraint. By dropping the most challenging transmission constraint, the robustness of the traditional reserve scheme can also be guaranteed. Thus, we can compare the new scheme and the traditional scheme fairly. In Section II-C, the sensitivity analysis regarding UMP is performed. We study the impacts of different uncertainty levels, ramping rates, generation capacities, and energy bids on UMPs. In Section II-D, the FTR underfunding issue is presented within the robust optimization framework. For the IEEE 118-Bus system, the UMPs related products are presented for different uncertainty levels in Section III-A. We also analyze the behaviors and impacts of flexible sources using an energy storage example in Section III-B.
II. 6-BUS SYSTEM
A 6-bus system is studied in this section. The one-line diagram is shown in Fig.1 . The unit data and line data are shown in Table I and Table II, respectively. Table III The authors are with the Robert W. Galvin Center for Electricity Innovation at Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL 60616, USA. (e-mail: hye9@hawk.iit.edu; yge9@hawk.iit.edu; ms@iit.edu; lizu@iit.edu). presents the load and uncertainty information. Column "Base Load" shows the hourly forecasted load. Assume that the load distributions are 20%, 40%, and 40% for Bus 3, Bus 4, and Bus 5, respectively.ū 1,t andū 3,t in Table III are the bounds of the uncertainties at Bus 1 and Bus 3, respectively. The uncertainty bounds at other buses are 0. It is assumed that the relative forecasting errors increase with hours. Uncertainty 1,t and 3,t also respect −Λ ·ū m,t ≤ m,t ≤ Λ ·ū m,t , ∀t, m (1a)
where (1a) denotes the uncertainty interval at a single bus, and (1b) represents the system-wide uncertainty [2] , [3] . The Λ and Λ ∆ are the budget parameters for the single bus and system, respectively. 
A. LMP and UMP
In this subsection, we show how to obtain the marginal prices for energy, uncertainty, and generation reserve according to Eqs. (11) and (14) in [1] . The payments and credits based on these prices are also calculated for market participants.
Consider the case where Λ = 1, Λ ∆ = 2. The CG based approach converges after 2 iterations. Hence, K = {1, 2}. The UC results are shown in Fig. 2 . The ON/OFF statuses of G1, G2, and G3 are denoted by black, blue, and red dots, respectively. It can be observed that the cheaper unit G1 is always on, G2 is off from Hour 5 to Hour 10, and G3 is off from Hour 1 to Hour 9. Given the UC solutions, the problem (RSCED) in [1] can be solved by commercial linear programming (LP) solver. The marginal prices are then obtained as byproducts.
The generation outputs are presented in Table V at Hours 21 and 22. It can be observed that G1 supplies most of the loads at Hour 21, which is 195.19 MW. According to the bid information in Table IV , G2 is much more expensive than G1 and G3. Hence, the output of G2 is relatively small and at the low level of its capacity. The upward and downward generation reserves provided by the three units are also listed Table VIII, and  Table IX , respectively. It is noted that UMPs still exist at buses without uncertainties (i.e., Buses 2, 4, 5, 6) . This is similar to LMPs, which also exist at buses where net power injections are 0. As shown in Table VII Table VII and Table IV . It means that both G1 and G2 cannot get more profits on energy by increasing or decreasing the outputs. The reserves provided by G1 and G2 are limited by their physical ramping rates. Hence, they can do nothing to increase the generation reserve payments. On the other hand, the marginal cost for G3 is $17.77/MWh when the output is 16.54 ∈ [16, 18]. The LMP paid to G3 is $35.26/MWh on Bus 6, which is $17.49/MWh larger than its marginal cost. It seems that if G3 provides more power, then it would get more profits on energy. However, increasing its output also results in lower upward generation reserve according to Eq. (18) in [1] . The upward UMP is $17.49/MW on Bus 6, which is exactly the difference between the LMP and G3's marginal cost. In other words, G3 cannot get more profits by deviating from the dispatch instruction. Hence, the UMP on Bus 6 is also the opportunity cost for G3 [4] . The analysis here also verifies the competitive market equilibrium shown in Section III-D of the companion paper.
In fact, the UMPs provide important price signals on the planning of renewable energy sources and storages. For example, according to the above analysis, the UMP at Bus 2 is relatively small. It is an ideal location for renewable energy sources in terms of payment for uncertainties. On the other hand, the UMP at Bus 4 is large, which may attract the long-term investment for storages or generation plants with large ramping rates because they can get more profits by providing generation reserves. As the UMPs are derived from the Lagrangian function, these planning activities also lower the total operation cost and increase the social welfare.
B. Comparison between Existing LMPs and Reserve Prices
The motivation of this subsection is to compare the proposed clearing scheme with the existing one. However, as the reserve is not robust in the traditional scheme, we cannot compare them fairly. With the observation that the transmission constraints are the most challenging one in the robust SCUC framework, we drop these constraints in this subsection. Doing so is equivalent to assuming that transmission line limits are large enough so that no line flow constraint is binding. By relaxing the transmission constraints, the robustness of the tranditional UC solution can be guranteed by adding the following spinning reserve constraints
where Q up i,t and Q down i,t is the largest upward and downward reserve, respectively.R t andR t are system wide reserve requirement. Refer to [5] , [6] for more details on the reserve formulations. In this paper, ∆T is set to 1. The reserve requirementsR t andR t are set to the system-wide lower bound and upper bound uncertainty in (1b), respectively. By adding the above (2a-2c) to (1a-3c) in [1] , we can form a new problem, whose solution is immunized against all the uncertainties and the same as the solution to RSCUC without transmission constraints. Therefore, we are able to compare the proposed pricing mechanism with the traditional one.
Consider the case where Λ = 0.8, Λ ∆ = 2. The generation schedules obtained from RSCUC and traditional SCUC are presented in Table X . The optimal solutions to the two models are the same. It verifies the analysis shown in the first paragraph in this subsection. It indicates that when the upper bound and lower bound of the system-wide uncertainty are available, the UC and generation schedules are robust against uncertainties in the traditional SCUC by setting the reserve requirement. Consider Hour 21, when the upper bound of the system-wide uncertainty is Therefore, the uncertainties can be accommodated by these reserves in the upward direction. Similar conclusion can be verified in the downward direction. Table XI presents the LMPs and UMPs in the case without transmission constraints. The LMPs obtained from the new scheme and the traditional one are the same. The UMPs are also the same as the reserve prices obtained from the traditional approach, which are the Lagrangian multipliers for (2c) in the simplified model [6] , [7] . As the transmission constraints are dropped, the marginal prices do not change with the locations, and there is a unique system-wide LMP and UMP at each interval. It is noted that the downward UMP at Hour 21 is zero, and the upward UMP at Hour 22 is zero.
In Table XI, It can be observed that the total reserve credit $1118 = 673.94 + 356.75 + 87.37 actually originates from the uncertainty payment $1118 = 882.65 + 235.36. However, in the traditional scheme, the reserve cost is allocated to the load serving entity [7] . In means that L2 and L3, which are located at buses 4 and 5, respectively, pay $447.24 = 1118.1 × 0.4 less at Hour 21 in the new scheme than in the traditional one.
Another observation is that the UMPs in Table XI are determined by the largest opportunity costs of generators. In this case, the upward and downward opportunity costs for generators are calculated as At Hour 21, the opportunity costs of G2 and G3 are zeros. It can also be verified by comparing the LMP and the marginal fuel costs. For example, generation schedule of G2 is 16.878 MW at Hour 21, and the LMP is $32.638/MWh, which is the same as the marginal cost. In the meantime, the opportunity cost of G1 is $17.474/MW, which is also the UMP. At Hour 22, the downward UMP is $17.474/MW, which is the opportunity cost of G2 or G3.
When considering transmission constraints, the generation reserve cannot be guaranteed at bus levels in the traditional SCUC model. The marginal prices are different in the two schemes.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we perform the sensitivity analysis of UMPs with respect to the uncertainty levels, unit capacities and ramping rates, and energy bids. The bus-level uncertainty level is defined by Λ, and the system uncertainty level is defined by the budget parameter Λ ∆ . We have Λ ∈ {0.5, 0.8, 1} and Λ ∆ ∈ {1, 2}.
The total operation costs are presented in Table XII . It can be observed that when Λ ∆ is fixed, the cost is a monotonically non-decreasing function of Λ. For example, the cost is $88,663 if Λ ∆ = 2 and Λ = 0.8. The cost is increased to $89,851 if Λ is changed to 1. When Λ is fixed, the cost is also a monotonically non-decreasing function of Λ ∆ . The cost in the case of Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 0.8 is $663 higher than that in the case of Λ ∆ = 1, Λ = 0.8. We can draw the conclusion that the operation cost for the base case may increase with the uncertainty level. A special case is simulated with Λ ∆ = 0, Λ = 0. It can be observed that the total operation cost is $87,975, which is the same as that in the case of Λ ∆ = 1, Λ = 0.5 and Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 0.5. It indicates that even if we ignore the uncertainties in the SCUC and SCED problems, certain level of robustness is still kept in the optimal solution as generation reserves are already available at individual buses. If the uncertainty level is below Λ = 0.5 at each bus, no additional cost is needed to immunize the system against the uncertainties. LMPs with respect to different uncertainty levels are presented in Table XIII . It can be observed that the LMPs also vary with different uncertainties. For example, all the LMPs from Bus 3 to Bus 6 increase with the increment of Λ, but LMP at Bus 1 decreases. It indicates that the uncertainty level is also reflected in the LMPs. The optimal generation schedules are presented in Table XIV. With Λ ∆ = 2, the generation output of G1 increases from 195.193 to 201.59 MW when Λ decreases from 1 to 0.8, while the outputs of G2 and G3 both decrease. As the fuel cost of G1 is lower, the total operation cost is reduced, which is consistent with the data in Table XII . On the other hand, the upward generation reserve (i.e. Q up 1 ) provided by G1 is reduced by 24-18.411 = 5.599 MW. Similar results can also be observed when the budget parameter Λ ∆ and Λ are at other values. Another observation is that if Λ = 0.5, the generation schedules remain the same when changing Λ ∆ . This is also consistent with the total operation cost data shown in Table XII . The generation reserves are the byproducts of the optimal solution to SCED problem.
The upward and downward UMPs are shown in Table XV  and Table XVI , respectively. The UMPs are zeros with Λ = 0.5. It indicates that the small perturbation of the uncertainty at Bus 1 and Bus 3 does not change the total operation cost for the base case. In this case, although both the upward and downward generation reserves are available according to The sensitivity data in these tables show that the uncertainties are only charged when the uncertainty level is above a certain threshold. Accordingly, the flexible resources are also entitled to credits for the uncertainty management. The market settlement related to uncertainties are shown in Table XVII . The payment to a generator is denoted as Θ G i,t , and the charge to an uncertainty source is denoted as Ψ m,t . They are calculated based on Eqs. One observation from Table XVII is that G3 gets more reserve credit in the case of Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 1 than Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 0.8, although it has smaller generation reserves in the first case. The reason is that the upward UMP at Bus 6 soars to $17.493/MWh from $2.596/MWh when Λ is increased from 0.8 to 1. The charge to the uncertainty source at Bus 3 is calculated as -15.4740 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 less. It indicates that uncertainty sources have the incentives to reduce the uncertainties. Next, we check whether the generators have the incentives to increase the ramping rates and generation capacities. Assume that the capacity of G2 is increased to 20.5 MW from 20MW, and the upward ramping is increased to 5.5MW/h from 5MW/h. The optimal schedules and marginal prices are listed in Table XVIII when Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 0.8. The new credit for managing uncertainty is 5.5 × 2.5961 = $14.28, which is larger than the original credit of $12.98. Therefore, G2 is entitled to more generation reserve and credit by increasing its flexibility. However, it also should be pointed out that the market participants are assumed as price takers in this paper [8] - [10] . If the changes of the flexibilities are large enough to change the UMPs, then the market participants may be able to manipulate the market.
In this section, generators only submit the energy bids (i.e. step-wise fuel costs shown in Table IV ), and the generation reserve bids are assumed to be zeros. It is also consistent with what is available in the literature [6] . In this paragraph, we demonstrate the impacts of energy bid changes on UMP. Consider the case where Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 0.8. The bidding prices of G2 in all segments are reduced by $2/MWh to $30.638/MWh, $30.674/MWh, $30.71/MWh, $30.746/MWh, and $30.782/MWh, respectively, while the bids of other units remain the same. Accordingly, we get another set of price signals after solving the problem (RSCUC). At Hour 21, the generation outputs remain the same. But both LMPs and UMPs are changed as shown in Table XIX . By comparing the LMPs in Table XIX and Table XIII , we observe that the energy prices for all the buses are lower when marginal prices of G2 are reduced. The UMPs also show the same trends by comparing the UMPs in Table XIX, Table XV, and  Table XVI . For example, the upward UMP at Bus 4 is reduced to $9.6973/MW from $10.951/MW, the upward UMP at Bus 6 is also reduced by $0.298/MW, and the downward UMP at Bus 1 decreases to $15.474/MW from $17.474/MW. It can be observed that the highest UMP has the largest change in this case. Similar to the discussion in the above paragraph, the trends may be altered if the participants have enough market power. The analysis on Nash-equilibrium would be an interesting future research.
D. FTR Underfunding
When Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 1, the generation schedules at Hour 21 are presented in Table XIV . The power flow of Line 2 is 97.63MW, which is smaller than its physical limit of 100MW. The fact that LMPs are different at different locations indicates that the congestion components in LMPs are non-zero. This is different from the traditional practice that congestion components exist only when certain power flows reach their limits. This is because the transmission reserve 100MW -97.63MW = 2.47MW is kept to guarantee the delivery of the generation reserve. At least one of the transmission constraints (9f) for Line 2 is binding in problem (RSCED) of the companion paper [1] , and at least one of their Lagrangian multipliers is positive. The positive Lagrangian multiplier leads to the congestion component of LMPs.
As stated in Section III-C in [1] , the LMPs obtained according to its definition in the robust optimization framework may lead to FTR underfunding. Consider a set of FTR amounts It means that the congestion payment collected from DAM is not enough to cover the FTR credit. The FTR underfunding value is $5554.77 − $5422.87 = $131.90.
Therefore, the FTR underfunding may occur in this scenario if the existing market mechanism is used. This example shows that the robust solution may lead to FTR underfunding in the traditional market framework. Now we consider the revenue residue after the UMP settlement in the market. The revenue residues are shown in the last column in Table XVII . When Λ ∆ = 2, Λ = 1, the revenue residue is $131.9, which is obtained as It can be observed that the FTR underfunding can be covered by the revenue residue exactly in this scenario. Therefore, the revenue is adequate at Hour 21.
As the UMPs vary with locations, there are congestion components when Λ = 1 and Λ = 0.5. According to the data in Table XVII , the revenue residues in these cases are also non-zero. This verifies Eqs. (12) and (23). The fact that the UMPs vary with locations indicates that at least one of the shadow prices η k l,t for line constraints is positive according to (12). The positive η k l,t must lead to the transmission reserve credit from (23). In other words, the revenue residue related to uncertainties must be positive. The revenue residue is then distributed to the FTR holders. Note that if and only if UMPs vary with locations, the revenue residue related to uncertainties is positive.
III. IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
The simulations are performed for the IEEE 118-bus system with 54 thermal units and 186 branches in this section. The peak load is 6600MW. The detailed data including generator parameters, line reactance and ratings, and load profiles can be found at http://motor.ece.iit.edu/Data/RSCUC 118 UMP.xls. Two cases are studied in this section.
1) The uncertainty levels and load levels are changed to analyze the simulation results in the system level. 2) An energy storage is installed at a specified bus with high UMP to show the potential application of UMPs.
A. Case 1
We assume that the uncertainty sources are located at buses (11, 15, 49, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 80, 90) . The budget parameter Λ ∆ is set to 10 in this section. The bus-level uncertainty budget parameter Λ changes from 0.2 to 0.3, and the bound of the uncertainty is the base load. The simulation results are shown in Table XX . It can be observed that the total operation cost increases with increasing Λ. The largest operation cost is $1,877,471 with Λ = 0.3. It indicates that a larger uncertainty level may increase the operation cost. The payments and credits related to UMPs are also listed in the table. The columns "Un. Payment" and "Gen. Res. Credit" denote the total payment from uncertainty sources and credit to generation reserves, respectively. It can be observed that the uncertainty sources pay less when the uncertainty level is low. The lowest payment is $11,043 and the highest one is $30,879. On the other hand, the credit entitled to the generation reserves is also a monotonically increasing function of Λ. When Λ = 0.3, the generation reserves have the highest credit. The last column "Rev. Res." shows that the revenue residues related to UMPs. It can be observed that the residue is always positive. When Λ is large, the residue is also high. As discussed in Section II-D, the residue exists when there are line congestions. Fig. 3 Fig. 3 , the high UMP at Bus 94 may attract investment of flexible resources, such as energy storages, in terms of generation reserve credit, and Bus 100 is an attractive location for the investment of renewable energy sources in terms of uncertainty payments. Fig. 4 shows the uncertainty payment and generation reserve credit with respect to load levels. The base load level is set at 100%. Higher loads in general lead to more uncertainty payments and generation reserve credits. It is also consistent with the heat map of UMPs in Fig. 3 , where UMPs at peak load hours are high. It suggests that the generation reserves also become scarce resources when load levels are high.
B. Case 2
As discussed in Case 1, the upward UMP on Bus 94 is high at Hour 11. Assume that an energy storage (8MW/30MWh) is installed at Bus 94. A simple model for the energy storage is formulated as indicators of discharging and charging. As the UMP is the major concern in this section, we use simplified parameters for storage. The discharging efficiency ρ d and charging efficiency ρ c are set to 100%. The capacity E max and initial energy level E 0 are set to 30 MWh and 15 MWh, respectively. The maximal charging rate R D and discharging rate R C are set to 8 MW/h. By introducing the energy storage, the new operation cost is reduced to $1,875,211 from $1,877,471. The payment collected from the uncertainty sources becomes $27,473, and the credit to generation reserves decreases to $24,289. Compared to the data in Table XX , the energy storage also helps to reduce the payment related to UMPs. The storage is entitled to $1326 generation reserve credit. Fig. 5 depicts the new upward UMPs after the installation of the energy storage. Compared to that in Fig. 3 , the upward UMP for Hour 11 at Bus 94 decreases a lot. The UMPs for Hour 10 and 12 are also lower. It suggests that sitting the energy storage at Bus 94 effectively lower the generation reserve price.
The simulation results show that the energy storage can provide additional upward and downward generation reserves. It is demonstrated that flexible resources can lower the UMPs, and UMPs provide the investment signal at locations where generation reserves are scarce resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
The two-part paper propose a new market scheme to charge the uncertainty sources and credit the generation reserve providers according to the UMPs in day-ahead electricity markets. The UMP formulation is derived within a robust optimization framework. We also characterize the market equilibrium for the new market mechanism. Our study also shows that traditional pricing mechanism within RSCUC framework may lead to FTR underfunding and the payment collected from uncertainty sources can cover the deficit. Our study shows load serving entities can have lower energy prices within the new market scheme, as the reserve fees are paid by uncertainty sources. It can prevent market participants with uncertainties from gaming the system to certain extent.
An important future research on this topic is that flexible resources, such as generators with large generation reserves and storages, can bid the generation reserves within the RSCUC framework. The Nash-equilibrium for UMP is also our ongoing research. The UMPs derived in this paper also provide an important price signal for the long-term investment of flexible resources. When the upward UMP or downward UMP at a bus is high, the investor can get more return in terms of generation reserves. Many potential applications on UMPs are open for future research.
